Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249039 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 400
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
In a canonical model of military conflict, victory and defeat depend stochastically on the difference of resources deployed by the conflict parties. The present paper offers a comprehensive analysis of that model. The unique Nash equilibrium reflects either (i) peace, (ii) submission, (iii) insurgency, or (iv) war. Intuitive predictions regarding possible transitions between these types of equilibria are obtained. The analysis identifies advances in weaponry as an important driver of conflict and, less often so, of its resolution. The formal derivation exploits the variation-diminishing property of higher-order Pólya frequency functions.
Subjects: 
Military conflict
difference-form contest
insurgency
Pólya frequency functions
JEL: 
C02
C72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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