Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249039 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 400
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
In a canonical model of military conflict, victory and defeat depend stochastically on the difference of resources deployed by the conflict parties. The present paper offers a comprehensive analysis of that model. The unique Nash equilibrium reflects either (i) peace, (ii) submission, (iii) insurgency, or (iv) war. Intuitive predictions regarding possible transitions between these types of equilibria are obtained. The analysis identifies advances in weaponry as an important driver of conflict and, less often so, of its resolution. The formal derivation exploits the variation-diminishing property of higher-order Pólya frequency functions.
Schlagwörter: 
Military conflict
difference-form contest
insurgency
Pólya frequency functions
JEL: 
C02
C72
D74
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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