Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249161 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1987
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target potential competitors yet fly under the radar of current merger control due to the features of the digital economy. We empirically study the competitive effects of big tech acquisitions on competitors in a relevant online market. We identify acquisitions by GAFAM involving apps from 2015 to 2019, matching these to a comprehensive database covering apps available in the Google Play Store. We find that competing apps tend to innovate less following an acquisition by GAFAM, while there seems to be no impact on prices and privacy-sensitive permissions of competing apps. Additionally, we find evidence that affected developers reallocate innovation efforts to unaffected apps and that affected markets experience less entry post-acquisition.
Schlagwörter: 
mergers and acquisitions
digital markets
GAFAM
apps
innovation
privacy
event study
JEL: 
K21
L41
L86
G34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
793.9 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.