Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249251 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 56
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in legislation governing, protecting, and rewarding whistleblowers. Whereas the EU recently enacted a Directive protecting whistleblowers, the US has gone one step further long ago, not only protecting them but also offering substantial monetary rewards for their information. In this paper. we review the evidence for the effectiveness of US whistleblower reward programs and consider some recent novelties. We also consider objections against these programs and local factors in the US that likely contribute to their success. Finally, we voice some concerns over the EU Directive's ability to achieve its policy objective of enhancing enforcement of Union law.
Schlagwörter: 
whistleblowers
whistleblower rewards
corporate wrongdoing
JEL: 
K10
K20
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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