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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 654
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's move: they know which future partition, and hence payoffs, will be reached with what probability. We show that if coalitions make mistakes with positive probability, i.e., if they choose probabilities that are always above some e > 0, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Schlagwörter: 
abstract games
hedonic games
farsighted stability
coalition stable equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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