Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250684 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 15023
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner's dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant of cooperation. This comment introduces the "Payback" strategy, which is similar to TFT but is sustainable in equilibrium. Using the data from the original article, we show that Payback captures most of the empirical support previously attributed to TFT, and that the risk dominance criterion based on Payback can explain the observed cooperation patterns.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric strategies
imperfect monitoring
indefinitely repeated games
risk dominance
strategic risk
JEL: 
C72
C73
C91
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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