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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 188
Versionsangabe: 
This version: January 2022
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the classical setting by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). This allows us to formally identify the endowment and attachment effect and study their impact on information rents, allowing us to show that, in contrast to other behavioral approaches to the bilateral trade problem, the impossibility of inducing materially efficient trade persists in the presence of loss aversion. We then turn to the design of optimal mechanisms and consider the problem of maximizing the designer's revenue as well as gains from trade. We find that the designer optimally provides the agents with full insurance in the money dimension and with partial insurance in the trade dimension, thereby reducing ex-post variation in agents' payoffs.
Schlagwörter: 
Bilateral trade
loss aversion
mechanism design
endowment and attachment effect
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Rent Seeking
Verlustaversion
Bilateraler Handel
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Rent Seeking
Verlustaversion
Bilateraler Handel
JEL: 
C78
D01
D02
D82
D84
D90
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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