Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/251435 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 339
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version, December 2021
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Increasing inequality and associated egalitarian sentiments have again put redistribution on the political agenda. Other-regarding preferences may also affect support for redistribution, but knowledge about their distribution in the broader population and how they are associated with political support for redistributive policies is still scarce. In this paper, we take advantage of Swiss direct democracy, where people voted several times on strongly redistributive policies in national plebiscites, to study the link between other-regarding preferences and support for redistribution in a broad sample of the Swiss population. We document that inequality aversion and altruistic concerns play a quantitatively large positive role in the support for redistribution, in particular for more affluent individuals. In addition, previously identified key motives underlying opposition to redistribution - such as the belief that effort is an important driver of individual success - play no role for selfish individuals but are highly relevant for altruistic and egalitarian individuals. Finally, while inequality averse individuals display strong support for policies that primarily aim at reducing the incomes of the rich, altruistic individuals are considerably less supportive of such policies. Thus, knowledge about the fundamental properties and the distribution of individuals' other-regarding preferences also provides a deeper understanding about who is likely to support specific redistributive policies.
Schlagwörter: 
Social preferences
altruism
inequality aversion
preference heterogeneity
demand for redistribution
Altruismus
Soziale Ungleichheit
Aversion
Politisches Verhalten
Schweiz
JEL: 
D31
D72
H23
H24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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