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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Grimm, Oliver | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ried, Stefan | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-19 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T14:44:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T14:44:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2007,028 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E61 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monetary union | en |
dc.subject.keyword | heterogeneities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | policy game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | simultaneous policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sequential policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | coordination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | discretionary policies | en |
dc.subject.stw | Währungsunion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geldpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Macroeconomic policy in a heterogeneous Monetary Union | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 558548563 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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