Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252022 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9505
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporate a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In the optimum, banks with lower monitoring costs are larger, choose riskier portfolios, and have less equity. Binding capital requirements or levies on bank borrowing are shown to make higher-risk portfolios more attractive. Accounting for banks' interior capital choices can thus explain why higher capital ratios incentivize banks to undertake riskier projects.
Schlagwörter: 
voluntary equity
capital requirements
bank heterogeneity
JEL: 
G28
G38
H32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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