Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252108 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9591
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Performance ranks introduce a trade-off for workers. They have to choose between signaling high productivity or signaling social compatibility to peers. Using a long-term experiment at a sweater factory, this paper disentangles the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive either private or public ranks. In response, intrinsic incentives from private ranks do not affect productivity. But publicly-ranked workers reduce productivity to conform to their social groups in the workplace. Additionally, cooperation decreases among the workers, although with limited effect on productivity. The paper shows how inducing competition among workers may be counterproductive for firms.
Subjects: 
ranks
social conformity
cooperation
JEL: 
D23
J53
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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