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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1605-1654
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R(m - 1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m-best response sequence (m-BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive-form best response sets (Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012). The strategies that survive m rounds of extensive-form rationalizability are consistent with an m-BRS, but there are m-BRS's that are disjoint from the former set. As such, there is behavior that is consistent with R(m - 1)SBR but inconsistent with m rounds of extensive-form rationalizability. We use our characterization to draw implications for the interpretation of experimental data. Specifically, we show that the implications are nontrivial in the three-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Centipede games.
Schlagwörter: 
Epistemic game theory
strategic uncertainty
bounded reasoning
identifying reasoning
JEL: 
D01
D03
D83
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