Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253465 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 639-675
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move only once. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.
Subjects: 
Bayesian persuasion
communication
competition in persuasion
multiple senders
sequential persuasion
JEL: 
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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