Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253479 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 101-128
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends May's theorem.
Schlagwörter: 
Shareholder voting
axioms
share majority rule
merger consistency
reallocation invariance
one share-one vote
difference rules
ratio rules
JEL: 
D71
G34
K22
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