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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1391-1430
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most tempted to defect.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategic communication
relational contracts
JEL: 
C73
D82
D83
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Dokumentart: 
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