Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25634 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,068
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. These idiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider’s inclination to acquire information. True demand expectations are not evolutionarily stable when beliefs, via revelation, can be used to commit to more aggressive behavior. The commitment effect fades away in large markets and has the same direction for both strategic substitutes and complements. Whether one observes an insider, in the long run, depends on information costs. For strategic substitutes insider activity benefits the whole population whereas the uninformed sellers could gain even more than the insider.
Schlagwörter: 
co-evolution of idiosyncratic beliefs
inside information
heterogeneous markets
information sharing
JEL: 
C79
D43
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
494.8 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.