Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256781 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 314
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players' beliefs about others' behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player's choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents' intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.
Schlagwörter: 
Anchoring Bias
Auctions
Games
Incomplete Information
Strategy
JEL: 
D01
D91
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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