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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Güth, Werner | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-07-30 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-27T09:40:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-27T09:40:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,055 | en |
dc.subject.jel | B4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D81 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D10 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Satisficing | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bounded rationality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimality | en |
dc.subject.stw | Beschränkte Rationalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entscheidung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 572968353 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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