Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257458 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 40 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-27
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
I designed an experiment to study the persistence of the prevailing levels of reasoning across games. Instead of directly comparing the k-level(s) of reasoning for each game, I used cognitive load to manipulate the strategic environment by imposing variations on the subject's cost of reasoning and their first- and second-order beliefs. Subjects have systematic changes in k-level(s) of reasoning across games. That finding suggests that subjects are responsive to changes in the strategic environment. Changes in k-level(s) of reasoning are mostly consistent with the endogenous depth of reasoning model when subjects are more cognitively capable or facing less cognitively capable opponents. Subjects have cognitive bounds, but often choose a lower-type action due to their beliefs about their opponents. Finally, cognitive ability plays a significant role in subjects making strategic adjustments when facing different strategic environments.
Subjects: 
cognitive load
endogenous depth of reasoning
guessing game
level-k reasoning
strategic thinking
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Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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