The (non) economic properties of the law

Katz, Leo; Sandroni, Alvaro

doi:doi:10.3390/g12010026

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257508

Title:

The (non) economic properties of the law

Authors:

Katz, Leo
Sandroni, Alvaro

Year of Publication:

2021

Citation:

[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 26 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-8

Publisher:

MDPI, Basel

Abstract:

This paper shows that the logical properties of constraints imposed by law are fundamentally different from other constraints considered in economics such as budget constraints and bounded rationality constraints, such as the ones based on inattention or shortlisting. This suggests that to fully incorporate law into economics may require a revision of economic theory.

Subjects:

law
order
rationalizability

Persistent Identifier of the first edition:

doi:10.3390/g12010026

Creative Commons License: