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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 31 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-12
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before those in the low-scoring group. In this paper, we study a class of the Guangzhou mechanisms, including the immediate acceptance (IA) and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism. We show that, if a collection of groups is refined by splitting its groups into a larger number of smaller subgroups, then the Guangzhou mechanism will perform more stably and less manipulable than before. This result provides a tool for policy makers to improve the allocation outcome of the IA mechanism under homogeneous priorities and justifies the use of a high-scoring student protection policy in Guangzhou's high school admission.
Schlagwörter: 
immediate acceptance mechanism
school choice
test score
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