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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 76 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-10
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
Schlagwörter: 
legislature
lobbyist
parties
voting
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