Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257576 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 94 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many different weights induce the same mapping from committee members' preferences to winning candidates. The numbers of respective weight equivalence classes and hence of structurally distinct plurality committees, Borda commitees, etc. differ widely. There are 6, 51, and 5 plurality, Borda, and antiplurality committees, respectively, if three players choose between three candidates and up to 163 (229) committees for scoring rules in between plurality and Borda (Borda and antiplurality). A key implication is that plurality, Borda, and antiplurality rule are much less sensitive to weight changes than other scoring rules. We illustrate the geometry of weight equivalence classes, with a map of all Borda classes, and identify minimal integer representations.
Subjects: 
collective choice
scoring rules
simple voting games
weighted committee games
weighted voting
JEL: 
D71
C71
C63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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