Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257600 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 24 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-6
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (rÏ2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner's expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players' heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.
Subjects: 
accuracy
all-pay auction
discrimination
heterogeneous valuations
optimal design
Tullock contest
JEL: 
C72
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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