Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258905 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CEBI Working Paper Series No. 05/19
Publisher: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI), Copenhagen
Abstract: 
Discussions about the legitimacy and welfare consequences of paternalistic interventions usually begin with the assumption that regulators are both benevolent and competent. We present experimental evidence that neither need be the case. In our experiment, individuals choose whether to restrict the choice of another participant and we see that regulation, on average, decreases choice efficiency. While more competent regulators are more likely to restrict choice sets in order to improve welfare for subjects when they use their regulatory privilige, selection into being an active regulator is unrelated to competence. The propensity for kind regulation is increasing in own competence, while the propensity for unkind regulation is both negatively related to own competence and positively related to the competence of the subject.
Subjects: 
Paternalism
choosing for others
risk preferences
beneficence
JEL: 
C91
D60
D62
D64
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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