Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259843 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2000:21
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper models corporatism as affecting both the preferences of the parties involved as well as the rules of the game. The analysis is conducted in a union-government game on determining wages and unemployment benefits. The result indicates that international conditions might be important for the functions of the concept of corporatism. It may also serve as an explanation to the poor performance on production and employment in some of the former so successful European corporatist states in the 1990s. The implication of this is that corporatism might not be a successful social organisation in the globalised economy.
Subjects: 
Corporatism
Interest groups
Labour unions
JEL: 
J32
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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