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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2002:17
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategy-proof
Indivisible object
Housing market
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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