Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259881 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2004:8
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and like the Clark-Groves mechanisms in general not "budget balanced". The efficiency loss due to fairness and strategy-proofness becomes measurable in monetary terms. Two interpretations of the formal model is discussed. First, it is a situation where a given sum of money has to be distributed as wages and fair wages are to be implemented. Second, it is as an auction model where a number of objects are simultaneously traded.
Subjects: 
ndivisibilities
fairness
strategy-proofness
wages
Vickrey-auction
JEL: 
C68
C71
C78
D61
D63
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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