Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259920 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2005:37
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary dynamics
Neutrally stable strategies
ascending NSS
Eroding NSS.
JEL: 
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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