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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2006:21
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we investigate collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly where firms have different discount factors. In order to study how a collusive agreement is reached we model the equilibrium selection as an alternating-offer bargaining game. The selected equilibrium has several appealing features: First, it is efficient in the sense that it entails immediate agreement on the monopoly price. Second, the equilibrium shows how discount factors affect equilibrium market shares. A comparative statics analysis on equilibrium market shares reveals that changes in discount factors may have ambiguous effects on market shares.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining
different discount factors
explicit collusion
market shares
JEL: 
C72
D43
L11
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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