Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259938 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2007:4
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Pre-play communication only has a significant impact on cooperation when no intraplay communication is possible. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
Schlagwörter: 
Renegotiation
Communication
Cooperation
Experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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