Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259984 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2010:8
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We analyze how a benevolent, privately-informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy's growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs. We model two types of agents: "trusting" and "distrustful." The former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency, whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency. We identify both "revealing" and "nonrevealing" equilibria and demonstrate that the "nonrevealing" equilibria can dominate the "revealing" equilibria in terms of ex-post social welfare.
Subjects: 
Social welfare
information
forecasting
asset pricing
heterogeneous beliefs
JEL: 
D83
G11
G12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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