Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260043 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2012:18
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be ``efficient" and (group) non-manipulable for ``almost all" preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well-known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework.
Schlagwörter: 
House allocation
rent control
rationing
rationing price equilibrium
priority efficiency
non-manipulability
JEL: 
C71
C78
D63
D71
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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