Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260075 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013:17
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one's future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiment
Information
Ignorance
JEL: 
D03
D81
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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