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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013:43
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
Schlagwörter: 
Package assignment
Indivisible objects
Strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C70
D47
D61
D63
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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