Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260212 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2017:3
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.
Schlagwörter: 
risk pooling
risk sharing
social norms
linear public goods game
cooperation decay
stable cooperation
JEL: 
D03
D80
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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