Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260220 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017:11
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n >= 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.
Subjects: 
evolutionary game theory
evolutionarily stable strategy
ESS
non-uniformly random matching
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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