Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260246 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2018:17
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategyproofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges his object, he pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment which is identical for all agents) independently of which object he consumes. Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents' valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.
Schlagwörter: 
Fixed Tax
Exchanges
Top Trading
JEL: 
C71
C78
D63
D71
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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