Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260250 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2018:21
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
Subjects: 
Characterization
House-allocation
Strategy-proofness
Multiobject auction
JEL: 
D44
D47
D63
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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