Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260692 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 244v2 [Publisher:] Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2021
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Ever since the major inflow of refugees (the "refugee crisis") in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem can be addressed with two market mechanisms. First, tradable quotas minimize the cost of asylum provision for host countries. Second, a matching system gives refugees more discretion over where they are sheltered. While this proposal is theoretically appealing, it has yet to be tested in practice.
Schlagwörter: 
international migration
refugees
EU asylum policy
tradable quotas
matching
public goods
JEL: 
F22
H87
K33
O19
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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