Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260720 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 486 [Publisher:] Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2021
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Labor market institutions that may weaken workers' bargaining leverage have received increased scrutiny in recent years. One example is noncompete agreements, which prevent workers from freely moving across employers, potentially weakening earnings growth. New data sources and empirical evidence have led policymakers to consider sharp restrictions on their use, especially among lower-income workers. These restrictions take many different forms, each of which has unique tradeoffs between the desire to protect workers while allowing firms to use noncompetes in cases where they may create social value.
Schlagwörter: 
noncompete agreements
employment law
wages
job mobility
JEL: 
J30
J41
J42
J68
K31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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