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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Konstantinidis, Nikitas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-01-02 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:16:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:16:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the core' countries' interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2076 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F53 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftsunion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Integration | en |
dc.subject.stw | Koalition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mehr-Länder-Modell | en |
dc.subject.stw | Europäische Integration | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 555908445 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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