Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261499 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1738
Versionsangabe: 
This Version: June 29, 2022
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Common ownership - where several firms are (partially) owned by the same investors - and its impact on product market competition has recently drawn much attention. This paper focuses on its implications for market entry. Specifically, we consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets that are opened up by the end of regulatory protection and which were previously dominated by a single firm selling the brand name drug. We find evidence that common ownership affects entry in US pharmaceutical markets. In particular, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to a reduction in entry, both at the individual and market level. This key finding is robust to different measures of common ownership, different sets of potential entrants, different estimation methods and specifications, different market definitions, and different outcome variables.
Schlagwörter: 
Market Entry
Ownership Structure
Pharma
JEL: 
G23
K21
L11
L41
L65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.05 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.