Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262693 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 291
Publisher: 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Chicago, IL
Abstract: 
We demonstrate that political geography has value to firms. We do so by exploiting shocks to political maps that occur around redistricting cycles in the United States. These keep some firms in Congressional districts that are largely unchanged at one extreme and reassign other firms to entirely new sets of constituents at the other extreme. Our main finding is that firms suffer from being reassigned into districts that are competitive across parties relative to safer districts. The effects are not trivial in magnitude. Moreover, they do not depend on whether firm retain the same politician or actively make campaign contributions.
Subjects: 
Political Geography
Redistricting
Capture Theory
Representation
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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