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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Long, Ngo Van | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sengupta, Bodhisattva | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-07-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:31:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:31:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2345 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Yardstick competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rent-seeking | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public good | en |
dc.subject.keyword | electoral incentives | en |
dc.subject.stw | Yardstick Competition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rent Seeking | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 572270704 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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