Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265530 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 392
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player generalization of tit-for-tat. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. When one of three firms in a market is an algorithm, we observe significantly higher prices compared to human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion, although humans do seem to perceive algorithms as more disruptive.
Schlagwörter: 
algorithms
collusion
human-computer interaction
labora-tory experiments
JEL: 
C90
L41
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-391-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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