Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266522 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
JRC Digital Economy Working Paper No. 2021-05
Verlag: 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Seville
Zusammenfassung: 
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing. We study the incentives of a data broker to sell data about a segment of the market to three competing firms. The segment only includes a share of the consumers in the market around one of the firms. Data are never sold exclusively. Despite the data are particularly tailored to the potential clientele of one of the firms, we show that the data broker has incentives to sell the list to its competitors. Such market outcome is not socially optimal, and a regulator that aims to maximise consumers and social welfare should consider mandating data sharing.
Schlagwörter: 
data markets
personalised pricing
price discrimination
oligopoly
sellingmechanisms
JEL: 
D43
K21
L11
L13
L41
L86
M21
M31
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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