Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267665 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industrial Engineering International [ISSN:] 2251-712X [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] S1 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 231-252
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
In this study, the implications of the government's tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government's tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled in six scenarios in a competitive mode about service level, social welfare, and government's revenue-seeking policies. It can be concluded that retailer services affect the optimal manufacturer and retailer's decisions. Moreover, with the sensitivities analysis that was studied on government models, it was shown that an integrated SC could better serve the government to achieve its goals. Also, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailer of a dual-channel supply chain have been reached to the government's social and economic goals. It can be found that the government with proper tariffs could coordinate social, economic, and service objectives.
Subjects: 
Dual-channel supply chain
Government regulation
Game theory
Retail services
Pricing policies
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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