Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268614 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Eastern European Economics [ISSN:] 1557-9298 [Volume:] 61 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Taylor & Francis [Place:] Abingdon [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 111-130
Verlag: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Zusammenfassung: 
This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.
Schlagwörter: 
political connections
redistribution
agricultural subsdies
businesspeople-politicians
Russia
JEL: 
D72
H23
H25
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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