Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270580 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CINCH Series No. 2019/03
Verlag: 
University of Duisburg-Essen, CINCH - Health Economics Research Center, Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper analyzes the impact of physicians' altruism and motivation on the outcomes of pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare, where a fixed price contract on quantity is supplemented with a relative performance contract on quality. Our theoretical model forecasts crowding out of most altruistic types. In an empirical application to the Medicare's nationwide natural experiment with a relative performance contract on quality for acute inpatient care since 2013, we observe the proof of this prediction. Namely, the quality dimensions, which are linked to patient's benefit, demonstrate higher deterioration among top-performing hospitals than other incentivized dimensions.
Schlagwörter: 
incentives contracts
altruism
dynamic panels
healthcare
JEL: 
C22
C23
D21
D22
I18
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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